Translated From 《The Economist》,By ecocn team http://www.ecocn.org
中国神话：经济快速增长并不是依赖出口2008-01-09[2008.01.03] Economics focus: An old Chinese myth中国神话
An old Chinese myth
Jan 3rd 2008
From The Economist print edition
Contrary to popular wisdom, China's rapid growth is not hugely dependent on exports
MOST people suppose that China's economic success depends on exporting cheap goods to the rich world. If so, its growth would be seriously dented by a stuttering American economy. Headline figures show that China's exports surged from 20% of GDP in 2001 to almost 40% in 2007, which seems to suggest not only that exports are the main driver of growth, but also that China's economy would be hit much harder by an American downturn than it was during the previous recession in 2001. If exports are measured correctly, however, they account for a surprisingly modest share of China's economic growth.
The headline ratio of exports to GDP is very misleading. It compares apples and oranges: exports are measured as gross revenue while GDP is measured in value-added terms. Jonathan Anderson, an economist at UBS, a bank, has tried to estimate exports in value-added terms by stripping out imported components, and then converting the remaining domestic content into value-added terms by subtracting inputs purchased from other domestic sectors. At first glance, that second step seems odd: surely the materials which exporters buy from the rest of the economy should be included in any assessment of the importance of exports? But if purchases of domestic inputs were left in for exporters, the same thing would need to be done for all other sectors. That would make the denominator for the export ratio much bigger than GDP.
Once these adjustments are made, Mr Anderson reckons that the "true" export share is just under 10% of GDP. That makes China slightly more exposed to exports than Japan, but nowhere near as export-led as Taiwan or Singapore (which on January 2nd reported an unexpected contraction in GDP in the fourth quarter of 2007, thanks in part to weakness in export markets). Indeed, China's economic performance during the global IT slump in 2001 showed that a collapse in exports is not the end of the world. The annual rate of growth in its exports fell by a massive 35 percentage points from peak to trough during 2000-01, yet China's overall GDP growth slowed by less than one percentage point. Employment figures also confirm that exports' share of the economy is relatively small. Surveys suggest that one-third of manufacturing workers are in export-oriented sectors, which is equivalent to only 6% of the total workforce.
Even if the true export share of GDP is smaller than generally believed, surely the dramatic increase in China's exports implies that they are contributing a rising share of GDP growth? Mr Anderson's work again counsels caution. Although the headline exports-to-GDP ratio has almost doubled since 2000, the value-added share of exports in GDP has been surprisingly stable over the same period (see left-hand chart). This is explained by China's shift from exports with a high domestic content, such as toys, to new export sectors that use more imported components. Electronic products accounted for 42% of total manufactured exports in 2006, for example, up from 18% in 1995. But the domestic content of electronics is only a third to a half that of traditional light-manufacturing sectors. So in value-added terms exports have risen by far less than gross export revenues have.
Many of China's foreign critics remain sceptical. They argue that China's massive current-account surplus (estimated at 11% of GDP in 2007) proves that it produces far more than it consumes and relies on foreign demand to buy the excess. In the six years to 2004, net exports (ie, exports minus imports) accounted for only 5% of China's GDP growth; 95% came from domestic demand. But since 2005, net exports have contributed more than 20% of growth (see right-hand chart).
This is due not to faster export growth, however, but to a sharp slowdown in imports. And even if the contribution from net exports fell to zero, China's GDP growth would still be close to 9% thanks to strong domestic demand. The boost from net exports is in any case unlikely to vanish, even if America does sink into recession, because exports to other emerging economies, where demand is more robust, are bigger than those to America. According to Standard Chartered Bank, Asia and the Middle East accounted for more than 40% of China's export growth in the first ten months of 2007, North America for less than 10%.
China's economy is driven not by exports but by investment, which accounts for over 40% of GDP. This raises an additional concern: that weaker exports could lead to a sharp drop in investment because exporters would need to add less capacity. But Arthur Kroeber at Dragonomics, a Beijing-based research firm, argues that investment is not as closely tied to exports as is often assumed: over half of all investment is in infrastructure and property. Mr Kroeber estimates that only 7% of total investment is directly linked to export production. Adding in the capital spending of local firms that produce inputs sold to exporters, he reckons that a still-modest 14% of investment is dependent on exports. Total investment is unlikely to collapse while investment in infrastructure and residential construction remains firm.
An American downturn will cause China's economy to slow. But the likely impact is hugely exaggerated by the headline figures of exports as a share of GDP. Dragonomics forecasts that in 2008 the contribution of net exports to China's growth will shrink by half. If the impact on investment is also included, GDP growth will slow to about 10% from 11.5% in 2007. This is hardly catastrophic. Indeed, given Beijing's worries about the economy overheating, it would be welcome.
The American government frequently accuses China of relying excessively on exports. But David Carbon, an economist at DBS, a Singaporean bank, suggests that America is starting to look like the pot that called the kettle black. In the year to September, net exports accounted for more than 30% of America's total GDP growth in 2007. Another popular belief looks ripe for reappraisal: it seems that domestic demand is a bigger driver of China's growth than it is of America's.
发表于13:23 | 阅读全文 | 评论 4 | 编辑 | 分享 0油价飙升非因短缺：民族主义的高潮2008-01-09[2008.1.3]The oil price 国际油价
The oil price 国际油价
Peak nationalism 民族主义的高潮
Jan 3rd 2008
From The Economist print edition
Oil keeps getting more expensive—but not because it is running out
NEW YEAR'S EVE has been and gone, but for oilmen, the party continues. On January 2nd, helped across the line by a New York trader eager for bragging rights, the first business day of the year, the price of their product topped $100 a barrel for the first time. Oil is now almost five times more expensive than it was at the beginning of 2002.
It would be natural to assume that ever increasing price reflects ever greater scarcity. And so it does, in a sense. Booming bits of the world, suchas China, India and the Middle Easthave seen demand for oil grow with their economies. Meanwhile, Western oil firms, in particular, are struggling to produce any more of the stuff than they did two or three years ago. That has left little spare production capacity and,in Americaat least, dwindling stocks. Every time a tempest brews in the Gulf of Mexico or dark clouds appear on the political horizon in the Middle East, jittery markets have pushed prices higher. This week, it wasa cold snap in America and turmoil in Nigeria that helped the price reach three figures.
No wonder, then, that the phrase “peak oil” has been gaining ground even faster than the oil price. With each extra dollar, the conviction grows that the planet has been wrung dry and will never be able to satisfy the thirst of abusy world.
Yet the fact that not enough oil is coming out of the ground does not meannot enough of it is there. There are many other explanations for the lacklustre response to the glaring price signal. For one thing, oil producers have tied their own hands. During the 1980s and 1990s, when the price was low and so were profits, they pared back hiring and investment to a minimum. Many ancillary firms that built rigs or collected seismic data shut up shop. Now oil firms want to increase their output again, they do not have the staff or equipment they need.
Worse, nowadays, new oil tends to be found in relatively inaccessible spots or in more unwieldy forms. That adds to the cost of extracting oil,because more engineers and more complex machinery are needed to exploit it—butthe end of easy oil is a far remove from the jeremiads of peak-oilers. The gooey tar-sands of Canada contain almost as much oil as Saudi Arabia. Eventually, universities will churn out more geologists and shipyards more offshore platforms, though it will take a long time to make up for two decades of under investment.
The biggest impediment is political. Governments in almost all oil-rich countries, from Ecuador to Kazakhstan, aretrying to win a greater share of the industry's bumper profits. That is natural enough, but they often deter private investment or exclude it altogether. The world's oil supply would increase markedly if Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shellhad freer access to Russia, Venezuela and Iran. In short, the world is facing not peak oil, but a pinnacle of nationalism.
最大的障碍却来自于政治。从厄瓜多尔到哈萨克斯坦，几乎所有盛产石油的国家的政府都试图从石油产业的庞大利润中多分一份。这也很正常，但他们经常禁止个人投资或者把个人投资完全排除在外。如果Exxon Mobil和Royal Dutch Shell能够更自由的进入俄罗斯、委内瑞拉和伊朗，那么世界石油的供给将会显著上升。简而言之，世界面对的不是石油拐点，而是民族主义的高潮。
None of that will help consumers or governments. The economic toll of expensive oil is just as high whether geology or politics is to blame—and the best response is just the same. Policy should encourage energy efficiency and support research into alternative fuels. Governments seeking to shield their citizens with subsidies or price caps should instead expose them to the full cost to foster frugality. All this will be hard and unpopular. But politicians might console themselves with the thought that even the most recalcitrant petro-regime is more malleable than the brute realities of geology.
发表于13:20 | 阅读全文 | 评论 4 | 编辑 | 分享 0泰国:感谢他信2008-01-09[2008.01.03]Counting Thaksin's blessings感谢他信
Counting Thaksin's blessings
Jan 3rd 2008 | BANGKOK
From The Economist print edition
By electing allies of the deposed prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, Thais have voted against the 2006 coup. But the country's worries are not over yet
IN STARK contrast to the terrible political violence in Pakistan and Kenya, Thailand's election, on December 23rd, was mostly peaceful. It also, notwithstanding perennial complaints of vote-buying, seemed largely fair. More remarkably, the military chiefs who deposed the government of Thaksin Shinawatra in a coup in 2006 seemed to accept the public's decision to overrule the coup and restore Mr Thaksin's allies to power in the form of the People's Power Party (PPP), a reincarnation of his disbanded Thai Rak Thai (TRT).
同巴基斯坦和肯尼亚恶劣的政治暴力完全不同，泰国12月23日的选举非常平静。尽管总是存在对贿选的抱怨，但总体上说，这次选举是公正的。更引人注目的是，虽然军方在 2006年的政变中推翻了他信·西那瓦领导的政府，但是军方领袖似乎接受了公众的决定：民众反对政变，并且投票支持他信盟友“人民力量党” （People's Power Party）掌权，而人民力量党可以看作是被解散的他信的泰爱泰党（Thai Rak Thai）的化身。
Mr Thaksin, too, has struck a conciliatory note. This week he said he would return from exile soon and invite the coupmakers to a round of golf. “For the sake of the country's reconciliation”, he would meet his nemesis, General Prem Tinsulanonda, the chief adviser to King Bhumibol, and the man widely presumed to be the mastermind behind the coup.
If so, Thailand may emerge from two years of political strife and regain its former status as a beacon of multi-party democracy in Asia. Until recently such an outcome had seemed improbable. In October a memo came to light detailing the junta's plans, through spreading black propaganda and fomenting anti-Thaksin protests, to subvert the election to thwart a PPP victory. However, embarrassed by the plan's discovery, and perhaps disheartened by months of unpopularity, the junta seems to have dropped the plan and let the people decide.
A potential spanner in the works is a decision by the Election Commission, due later this month, on which winning candidates will be disqualified for electoral malpractice. Early in the campaign the commission announced absurdly stringent regulations, raising fears it might apply them partially, to disqualify PPP candidates, or indeed the entire party, on flimsy grounds. The commission later absolved the junta over its plot to subvert the election, arguing that the conspiracy had not been enacted and thus no harm was done. If it is consistent it will judge poll-fraud allegations by the same yardstick, disqualifying elected members only if their rule-breaking may have altered the results. Early this week there were signs of splits in the commission, with one of its members saying he wanted to quit.
It had been widely assumed that the PPP would get the most seats but not enough to prevent its main rival, the Democrat party, from forming a governing coalition. However, the Thaksinites did better than expected, winning 233 seats, only eight short of a majority in the 480-seat lower house (see chart). This was in spite of a recent change to the electoral system—to merge single-seat constituencies into ones returning up to three members—that seemed designed to encourage Mr Thaksin's supporters to spread their votes around other parties. As the extent of the PPP's victory became clear on election night, Samak Sundaravej, Mr Thaksin's stand-in as party leader, insisted he would be prime minister. By the middle of this week it seemed as if the PPP had persuaded most or all of the five minor parties that won seats to join its coalition. This would give it a big enough majority to withstand all but an extravagant number of disqualifications.
人们普遍认为人民力量党将夺得最多席位，但是还不足以阻挡它的主要对手民主党组成联合政府。然而，他信主义者做的比预期要好，赢得了480个下院席位中的 233个，只差8个就能成为多数党。这还是在选举体系近来做了一些变化的情况下取得的。新的选举体系将单一议席选区合并成一个并选出3名候选人，这似乎是为了怂恿他信先生的支持者们给其它政党投票。在选举之夜，当人民力量党的胜利变的明朗时，该党主席，被认为是他信替身的沙马?顺达卫（Samak Sundaravej）坚称他将出任总理。在本周中，看上去人民力量党好像已经说服了部分或者所有5个赢得席位的小党加入它领导的联合政府。这将使该党能获得多数党地位，除非被剥夺资格的人过多。
Mr Thaksin took full advantage of his crushing majority in the last parliament, pushing his cronies into key institutional jobs while scorning his critics. His allies' new government may not have it so easy. For one thing, the Democrats emerged stronger from the election, gaining 165 seats, up from 96 in the 2005 election (when the lower house had 500 seats), so they should provide more effective opposition. Furthermore, a new constitution narrowly approved in a referendum in August strengthens the checks and balances against an over-mighty executive. This includes a dubious change in which some Senate members will be appointed by judges and officials (the rest will be elected, probably in March).
Ideally the PPP-led government would offer the advantages of the previous TRT ones—sound macroeconomic management and policies to aid poor rural villagers—without the disadvantages, such as Mr Thaksin's autocratic tendencies and conflicts of interest. To boost flagging economic growth and weak investment, confidence in the stability and competence of government needs to be restored swiftly.
Samak the knife
However, Thailand's political strife may not yet be over. Mr Samak, abrasive and uncouth, may prove an even more divisive prime minister than Mr Thaksin. Mr Samak is a staunch royalist but he is also a foe of General Prem, so it cannot be guaranteed that the generals and the Thaksinites will kiss and make up, especially since Mr Samak wants to lift Mr Thaksin's five-year ban from politics, and halt the corruption inquiries the coupmakers instigated against him. Mr Thaksin insists he has retired from politics but not everyone believes he will keep his word. If he or close relatives take top jobs in the new administration, and especially if he uses his restored power to seek revenge on the coupmakers, he risks renewed street protests and a reaction from the army's hardliners.
In the absence of such a disaster, history may look kindly on the perpetrators of Thailand's 18th coup since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932. They spilled no blood and kept their promise to restore democracy promptly. But they and their supporters would have been more nefarious had Thai public opinion not stopped them: they tried to insert a clause in the new constitution granting themselves sweeping powers in the event of a political conflict, and then tried to achieve the same by means of an ordinary law, which the military-appointed interim assembly watered down before passing last month.
The generals signally failed to prove the claims of “rampant corruption” and other misdeeds by Mr Thaksin used to justify the coup. Worse, they did nothing to correct the most heinous abuses of his administration: extrajudicial killings by police during a 2003 “war on drugs” and two massacres in 2004 of Muslim protesters by security forces in Thailand's troubled south. The junta and those among the fickle Bangkok elite who excused the coup should have learned their lesson that extra-constitutional excursions do not solve problems. That, however, may be too much to hope.
发表于13:18 | 阅读全文 | 评论 0 | 编辑 | 分享 0脱衣舞俱乐部：得克萨斯州杆子税2008-01-07[2008.01.03] Strip clubs-The Texas pole tax 脱衣舞俱乐部-得克萨斯州杆子税
The Texas pole tax
Jan 3rd 2008 | AUSTIN
From The Economist print edition
A good cause, but a bad policy
THERE is a new price to be paid for looking at naked women in Texas. On January 1st the state's strip clubs began imposing a $5 surcharge for each visitor. The “pole tax,” as it is commonly called, is expected to bring the state an additional $40m in revenue each year. Most of the proceeds will go to programmes that support victims of sexual assault.
在得克萨斯看裸体女人你得新付一笔钱了。从1月1号开始该州脱衣舞俱乐部开始向每位光临者收取5美元的额外费用。 “杆子税”（译注：pole tax这个词未找到词典解释，另有一个poll tax，指的是人头税。网上搜索了一下，有个网页说pole tax是poll tax转过来的，不知道正确不。Pole有“柱子”、“杆子”的意思，表演脱衣舞通常需要在舞台上立一根圆杆子让表演者攀爬，因此我推测是不是可以译成这个“杆子”税。但以上都是推测，希望知道的指点一下），这是它通常的叫法，预期每年为该州带来4千万美元的额外收入。该收入的绝大部分将用于支持性侵犯受害人计划。
Helping rape victims is obviously an excellent idea, and the measure was passed by the Texas legislature easily last year. But it is controversial in some quarters. Club owners, in particular, think they are being shaken down and vilified despite providing a perfectly legal service, and are already sounding a little defensive. Commercials for The Lodge, in Dallas, boast that its customers enjoy “women, manly steaks, cigars, and women.” In light of the new tax a co-owner has noted, rather less laddishly, that the club also raises money for charity via car washes. Smaller clubs are worried that their patrons cannot or will not pony up five measly dollars, a prediction that may prove true but is certainly rather depressing.
帮助强奸案受害人显然是个很好的计划，这个措施去年早些时候就通过了得克萨斯州的立法。但是在一些人中引起了争议。尤其是俱乐部老板，认为他们尽管提供的是完全合法的服务却被敲诈和诋毁，而且他们听起来有点自卫的味道了。达拉斯的“小屋”俱乐部的广告吹嘘说它的顾客们享受着“女人、适合男人的牛排、雪茄和女人”。看到这种新税，一位合伙人平静地提到（译注：rather less laddishly指更少男孩子气的，更少稚气的，到底怎么译，高手指点）他的俱乐部也通过洗车来为慈善事业筹钱。更小的俱乐部担心他们的顾客不能或者不愿意付清这区区5美元的小钱，这个预测可能被证明是正确的但当然相当令人沮丧。
Another gripe is that the tax implies an unfair link between club patronage and sexual violence, though no evidence to support this has been presented. State representative Ellen Cohen, who sponsored the legislation, argued that connecting the two is fair because both strip clubs and sex crimes objectify women. And apparently a majority of Texas legislators were comfortable with that explanation. In 2004, in contrast, Governor Rick Perry proposed taxing strip clubs to pay for public schools. The idea was considered inappropriate and it went nowhere.
另一个抱怨是该税不公正地暗示了在光临俱乐部和性暴力之间有着联系，尽管没有能够支持这一论点的证据被提出来。州议员Ellen Cohen，是他发起了这部法律，辩论说两者之间的联系是公正的，因为脱衣舞俱乐部和性犯罪都把妇女物化了。而且很显然，得克萨斯州的立法者们感到能坦然接受一解释。相反，2004年州长Rick Perry提议对脱衣舞俱乐部征税来为公立中学支付费用时这个想法被认为是不适当的而不了了之。
Such targeted taxes seem to be in vogue at the moment. Gavin Newsom, the mayor of San Francisco, recently proposed that retailers pay a fee for selling sugar-laden fizzy drinks. The revenue would fund a city initiative to encourage healthy eating and exercise. Last year's proposed expansion of the State Children's Health Insurance Programme would have been funded by increased tobacco taxes (though the connection here also seems rather a stretch, since not that many children smoke; George Bush vetoed it anyway). In Wisconsin, a state legislator wants to raise more money for the juvenile criminal justice system via a tax on video games.
Critics say that all of these measures are punitive. Louche behaviour, after all, is not a crime. But its practitioners have had a hard time making their case. Last month opponents of the pole tax filed for a temporary injunction against it. They argued that nude dancing is a type of expression and that its free exercise should therefore not be inhibited. The judge was unimpressed.
发表于12:35 | 阅读全文 | 评论 4 | 编辑 | 分享 0欧元:比美元更坚挺2008-01-07[2008.01.03]Déjà vu 似曾相识
The euro area 欧元区
Déjà vu 似曾相识
Jan 3rd 2008
From The Economist print edition
The euro area is not immune to the ills that afflict America and Britain
EARLY in the new year of 2001, Lucas Papademos attended his first meeting of the European Central Bank's (ECB) rate-setting council. Mr Papademos was there to represent Greece, which had just joined the single currency. A day before the meeting, the Federal Reserve had lowered its key interest rate by half a percentage point, the first of a string of cuts aimed at staving off recession. The ECB declined to follow the Fed's lead, deciding to keep its benchmark rate unchanged.
2001年新年伊始，作为刚刚使用欧洲统一货币的希腊政府的代表，Lucas Papademos首次出席欧洲中央银行（Eruopean CenrelBank，以下简称ECB）利率制定会议。会议开始前一天，美联储降息0.5个百分点，并由此展开一轮旨在防止经济衰退的降息风潮。ECB并没有效仿美联储的做法，而是决定保持基准利率不变。
Seven years on, the ECB enters the new year in an eerily similar position. On January 10th its policy meeting will welcome central-bank governors from two new members, Cyprus and Malta, which both adopted the euro on New Year's Day. Now, as then, inflation of close to 3% is the bank's main worry, since it remains fairly upbeat about GDP growth. The ECB's economists expect the euro area to grow by 1.5-2.5% this year—broadly in line with its potential, in other words, albeit with downside risks. Similarly, the bank expected “continuing robust, albeit slightly lower growth rates” at the start of 2001, despite worries about America's economy.
The first policy summit of 2008 is very likely to end with a decision to keep rates on hold, just as the January 2001 meeting did. Indeed the ECB is more minded to lift rates than cut them, judging from comments made by Jean-Claude Trichet, its president, following the bank's last meeting on December 6th. But if events keep playing out just as they did seven years ago, the ECB will be forced into lowering rates later this year.
Much depends on the economy's response to malfunctioning credit markets and the gathering economic gloom in America. An optimist would argue that the euro zone will prove resilient, because it does not have America's legacy of struggling subprime borrowers, its current-account deficit or its housing bubble.
A closer look prompts a less sanguine assessment. Europe has its own property hotspots. House-price gains in Spain and Ireland have been far greater than in America over the past decade. Both markets are now cooling. Even if Ireland's economy is too small to be a big part of the ECB's reckoning, Spain does have enough clout to alter the course of the euro area. Thomas Meyer at Deutsche Bank reckons that in the past five years, Spain accounted for more than one-third of the growth in consumer spending, more than half of the increase in investment and nearly two-thirds of the job gains of the euro area's big four economies.
The good times may be ending. Spain's boom has been built on a ready supply of loans. But the credit squeeze means borrowed funds are now harder to come by, which leaves its economy vulnerable. Cooling housing markets in France and in Italy are likely to hurt those economies too.
The euro zone also has financial imbalances to contend with. True, its current account has been broadly balanced, in contrast with America's large and persistent deficits. But that is mostly because Germany's current-account surplus, equivalent to 6% of GDP last year according to the OECD, has acted as a huge counterweight to deficits elsewhere.
The high level of saving by German firms contributes to this handsome surplus and masks a worrying fault line running through the euro area. Outside Germany, companies are heavily dependent on borrowing to finance their capital spending, which makes the outlook for investment very sensitive to conditions in credit markets. David Owen at Dresdner Kleinwort reckons that if Germany is excluded, the corporate sector's financing gap (the difference between income and spending) was almost 6% of GDP last year. That is a bigger funding shortfall than in 2000, on the eve of a savage retrenchment by firms that hurt jobs as well as investment (see chart).
德国公司的高水平储蓄使德国经常项目出现可观的盈余，并掩盖了欧元区内暗流般蔓延的担忧。在德国以外，各公司过分依赖借贷来为其资本开支筹集资金，使得其投资前景对信贷市场的状况十分敏感。Dresdner Kleinwort公司的David Owen指出，如果不算德国，各公司融资缺口（即收入和支出之间的差额）大约是欧元区去年GDP的6%。这一融资缺口比2000年那场破坏就业和投资的野蛮的公司紧缩战略风波前夕的缺口还要大（见图）。
Companies' reliance on borrowing is all the more worrying since banks play a far bigger role as suppliers of capital in Europe than in America. The banks' troubles have not yet crippled the supply of loans to companies. Indeed, as Mr Trichet pointed out last month, such borrowing rose by 13.9% in the year to October, a rate that “does not suggest that we are experiencing a credit crunch”. That could be premature. Mr Owen thinks the surge in borrowing may reflect firms taking up pre-arranged credit lines while they can.
The euro area may shrug off these ills, particularly if Germany powers ahead and consumer spending picks up. Germany's export machine has been fuelled by vigorous demand in emerging economies. Moreover, its companies can readily finance capital spending from profits. Even so, Mr Meyer at Deutsche Bank reckons that the export performance of the past two years is “unrepeatable”. A strong euro and sluggish growth (or worse) in Britain and America, the euro area's two biggest markets, mean exports are a less reliable source of demand.
The lesson of 2001 is that when the outlook for the economy appears bad enough, the ECB will cut interest rates, even if inflation is stubbornly high. Already, two other inflation-targeting central banks—in Britain and Canada—have followed the Fed's lead. If the banking crisis persists, the ECB may have to do likewise.
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